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Public Deliberation, Networks Analysis and the Political Integration of Muslims in 
Britain 
 
Manlio Cinalli and Ian O’Flynn 
 
In this article, we examine the assumption that, insofar as actors deliberate well, political 
integration will follow. We do so specifically with respect to the political integration of 
Muslims in the field of ethnic relations in Britain, using data retrieved from two quality 
British broadsheets. Our approach has two components. First, we consider the quality of 
the deliberative interventions actors make, comparing Muslim actors with other actors. 
Second, we use measures drawn from network analysis to assess the level of political 
integration as indicated by the ties that those deliberative interventions forge. Our 
findings show that the link between how Muslim actors deliberate and their political 
integration in the field is more complex that one might assume. Although Muslims do not 
deliberate as well as normative deliberative theory says they should, empirically they are 
politically integrated, having forged diverse relationships that avoid the danger of 
polarisation. 
 
Keywords: deliberative democracy; network analysis; political integration; ethnic 
relations; Britain. 
 
In recent years, the British government has become increasingly concerned about the lack 
of political integration of Muslims living in Britain. This concern, which can be viewed 
as part of a broader British concern with ethnic relations generally, is shared by a great 
many actors besides government, including civil society organisations, trade unions, the 
media and ordinary individuals. And of course it is also shared by some of those who 
define themselves in the first instance as ‘Muslim’.1 This article is not about the reasons 
why the political integration of Muslims has become such a salient topic in Britain. 
Rather, its aim is to offer a new perspective on that topic by considering the relationship 
between public deliberation and political integration. 
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There are many views on what public deliberation ideally ought to involve (cf. Cohen 
1989; Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Habermas 1996; Dryzek 2000). Yet all deliberative 
theorists agree that important decisions of law and policy should turn not just on the force 
of numbers but on what Jürgen Habermas calls ‘the force of the better argument’ 
(Habermas 1984, 25). As such, we must pay attention to the views of other actors, listen 
respectfully to what they have to say, and develop our views and opinions in ways that 
make them responsive to theirs. Insofar as actors live up to this normative ideal, 
deliberative theorists claim that certain normatively desirable consequences will follow. 
Some of those consequences are central to traditional understandings of political 
integration—inter alia, greater levels of engagement in public affairs, trust in government 
and faith in the democratic process, a strong sense of political self-efficacy, increased 
levels of information seeking and political participation (Fishkin 1995, 2009; Mendelberg 
2002; Delli Carpini et al. 2004; Searing et al. 2007). 
 
Our concern is to examine the extent to which public deliberation in Britain is linked to 
desirable consequences of this sort, focusing in particular on the political role and 
position of Muslims in the public sphere. For us, political integration is not just 
engagement in public affairs, trust in government, self-efficacy, and so forth, but consists 
especially of durable ties or relationships forged by and among different actors. Those 
relationships can be created or sustained in different ways or through different types of 
activity. On the face of it, one might naturally assume that public deliberation is one such 
activity (see Habermas 1987). Yet as Diana Mutz argues, this assumption may or may not 
be well founded. As she argues, ‘the tests of deliberative theory offered to date typically 
do not develop well-specified explanations for the relationships between deliberation and 
its many proposed benefits’ (Mutz 2008, 525). While deliberative theorists tend to 
assume that as long as actors deliberate well, political integration will follow, this 
assumption has not been systematically tested. We use network analysis to see whether 
the field of ethnic relations in Britain is characterised by durable ties and relationships 
between diverse actors and, in particular, to assess the specific contribution made by 
Muslims to the forging of those relationships. In sum, our aim in taking this approach is 
to check whether a relationship actually exists between public deliberation and political 
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integration and, if so, to offer an assessment of the character of that relationship.  
 
In the first section, we define ‘public deliberation’ in terms of three basic requirements or 
normative components. We argue, however, that when it comes to operationalising those 
requirements for the purposes of empirical analysis, particular attention must be paid to 
the actual context in which they are to apply. In the second section, we define what we 
mean by ‘political integration’. Whereas contemporary scholarship treats political 
engagement as the key indicator of political integration (e.g. van Deth et al. 2007; 
Morales and Giugni 2011), we stress the mutual ties or relationships that that engagement 
involves. In making this case, we distinguish between ties of support and dissent and 
emphasise the importance of considering whether the prevailing pattern of support and 
dissent maps onto deep divisions in the field. In the third section, we turn to questions of 
design and data. Our analysis has two main components—the first component involves 
evaluating ‘deliberative interventions’ in the field of ethnic relations in Britain, while the 
second component examines the relational dimension of this field. Since our data is 
drawn from newspapers, we also consider some attendant difficulties. In the fourth 
section, we present our findings, while in the fifth we turn to our discussion. 
 
Before proceeding, two points are worth noting. First, as we have said, the aim of this 
article is map the relationship between public deliberation and political integration in the 
field of ethnic relations in Britain. But since the relationship between public deliberation 
and political integration may look very different in, for example, Britain or France, we 
cannot safely generalise from our results. That said, our approach is not specific to the 
field of ethnic relations or to Britain; it could, conceivably, be applied to an indeterminate 
number of policy fields and countries. Secondly, as we have also indicated, deliberative 
democrats assume that if actors deliberate well, political integration will follow. Yet 
while this treats political integration as an outcome of public deliberation, one might just 
as easily suppose that political integration is a pre-requisite of public deliberation. Public 
deliberation probably does require some threshold level of political integration. But it 
may be that that threshold does not need to be very high for public deliberation to 
commence. Once it has commenced, it may well lead to greater levels of political 
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integration, just as deliberative democrats suppose. 
 
Deliberation 
Some deliberative theorists tend to focus on the policy domain of institutions and 
political elites (e.g. Bessette  1994; Habermas 1996; Elster 1998; Uhr 1998) whereas 
others tend to focus on the broader public domain of individuals and civil society (e.g. 
Mansbridge 1980, 1999; Fung 2003; Jacobs et al. 2009; Smith 2009). Yet in whichever 
domain, the general guiding assumption is that proposed laws and policies should be 
assessed on their merits—they should be based on the balance of evidence and not merely 
on the balance of voting power. 
 
That said, moving from the policy domain to the broader public sphere has required 
deliberative theorists to relax some standards and to introduce certain others. For 
example, some deliberative theorists claim that arguments for or against public policies 
should be couched in the language of democratic principles or other widely shared 
political considerations (e.g. Cohen 1996, 99–100; Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 3–4; 
Rawls 1996, 100–101). Yet this claim has led critics to argue that deliberative theory is 
biased against those who do not have access to a sophisticated political vocabulary and 
who might therefore struggle to express themselves in such terms (e.g. Sanders 1997; 
Williams 2000; Young 2000). Hence, these critics argue that instead of necessarily 
having to appeal to, for example, a principle of equality, ordinary people might instead 
simply describe events from their life histories (but see Dryzek 2000, 68–69). 
 
Shifting from one domain to another also has implications for those interested in 
measuring deliberation empirically. A good case in point here is the ‘discourse quality 
index’ (DQI), a quantitative measurement tool for assessing public deliberation 
(Steenbergen et al. 2003). Normatively, the DQI is expressly grounded in Habermas’s 
discourse ethics (Habermas 1991). In the ideal case, deliberation will be open, reasoned, 
respectful and authentic; it will also be marked by a concern for the common good and 
will aim at consensus. Yet the coding categories that are meant to measure the degree to 
which these attributes are present in any given instance of deliberation are as much a 
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reflection of the parliamentary context to which the DQI was originally intended to apply 
as of the normative theory from which they were originally derived. For instance, the 
DQI seeks to measure the openness of a parliamentary debate in terms of the degree to 
which a speaker is interrupted by some other parliamentarian (Steenbergen et al. 2003, 
27). Yet while one could also envision using this measure to assess the quality of 
deliberation on display in, for example, the context of a deliberative poll (Fishkin and 
Luskin 2005) or other such ‘mini-public’, it might not so easily apply to deliberation in 
the broader public sphere. This latter contains a plurality of actors who do not necessarily 
deliberate face-to-face. And since they may not have deliberated face-to-face, the degree 
to which one speaker is interrupted by another speaker is obviously not a telling measure. 
In any large democracy, it is impossible for everyone to deliberate together in a single 
arena. Consequently, actors must rely to a considerable extent on the mass media to make 
information available to them and to debate the pros and cons of different policy choices 
on their behalf. There is, in fact, a growing body of research that seeks to assess the 
quality of deliberation on display in the media, and especially in newspapers (e.g. Page 
1996; Ferree et al. 2002; Wessler 2008; Dolezal et al. 2010). Yet in order to measure 
claims made in the media, appropriate codes need to be devised—and indeed different 
codes may be required for different media (cf. Mutz 2008, 527). 
 
When it comes to devising appropriate codes, much will therefore depend on the 
particular locus to which those codes are to apply; there is no ‘one size fits all’ 
measurement instrument on which empirically-minded deliberative theorists can rely. 
Researchers must also be explicit about their guiding normative assumptions and the 
arguments for them. Our normative starting point is the fact that, in any modern 
pluralistic society, different actors will tend to see the world in different ways. This 
variation is perfectly natural. But it carries with it certain implications for how we ought 
to relate to one another as political equals. Recognising others as equals in political 
argument means recognising that those others can have reasons to hold their views as 
firmly as we hold ours. Hence, if we do not make a serious effort to deliberate with them 
and try to offer arguments that they could in principle accept, we fail to respect their 
standing as political equals (Cohen 1996, 101; Rawls 1996, 54–58). 
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This understanding of political equality can justify three of the more commonly posited 
requirements (or necessary conditions) of public deliberation. Any serious attempt to 
measure public deliberation must consider whether actors (i) couch their interventions in 
language that is acceptable to others, (ii) provide a valid supporting argument and (iii) 
show concern for the general interest. The thinking behind this last condition is this: since 
policy decisions are mutually binding, they should be mutually justifiable. Hence, actors 
should be prepared to appeal to the general interest (Gutmann and Thompson 1996). This 
is not to say that particular interests are irrelevant to the policy process. But ultimately 
policy decisions cannot be justified on such grounds alone. In short, deliberative 
democracy requires actors to take a broader view of public issues than merely consulting 
their own interests in them (O’Flynn 2010; cf. Mansbridge 2010). 
 
Political integration 
Political integration is often understood in terms of political interest, electoral 
participation and trust in both institutions and political elites (e.g. Verba et al. 1995; 
Berger et al. 2004; Jacobs et al. 2004; van Deth et al. 2007; Morales and Giugni 2011). 
This understanding of political integration places a great deal of emphasis on active 
engagement in the political life of the country in which an actor lives (Berger et al. 2004; 
Jacobs et al. 2004). More generally, for scholars who share this understanding, active 
engagement is treated as vital to democracy because it helps hold government to account 
while also fostering the sorts of civic disposition upon which a healthy demos depends. In 
this latter vein, John Stuart Mill famously argued that political engagement could 
contribute to the raising of the moral character: Each citizen ‘is called upon, while so 
engaged, to weigh interests not his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, by 
another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles and maxims 
which have for their reason of existence the common good’ (Mill [1861] 1991, 255). 
 
Our conceptualisation of political integration gives the same centrality to the idea of 
political engagement. However, we give a ‘relational twist’ to this idea by considering 
actors to be politically integrated when they have forged extensive ties with other actors 
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across the polity. These ties enable actors to exchange flows of information, reinforce 
overarching values and capitalise on opportunities for intervening in the policy process 
(e.g. Lin 2001; Diani and McAdam 2003; Cinalli 2004 and 2007). In so doing, we draw 
upon recent social science research on relational attributes and in particular on studies of 
social capital that have highlighted how actors access and make use of trust and resources 
through their ties, both at the individual level (Lin 1999 and 2001) and at the group level 
(Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1990; Putnam 1993 and 2000). Clearly, there is scope for 
applying lessons from the study of social capital to issues of ethnic and religious 
integration: for example, recent scholarship has shown that participation in political 
elections can be explained by reference to the structure of ethnic communities as 
reflected in networks of ethnic organisations (Fennema and Tillie 1999). 
 
In a further advancement of previous studies, we focus not only on ties of support, as an 
indicator of the exchange of values, resources, trust etc., but also on ties of dissent. The 
analysis of patterns of support is useful to detect underlying structures of mutual alliance, 
while the analysis of patterns of dissent is useful to detect underlying structures of mutual 
opposition, that is, structures that are less favourable to the exchange of values, resources, 
trust etc. At the same time, we examine systematically not only ties which Muslims forge 
with civil society actors in the public domain but also ties which Muslims forge with 
institutions and political elites in the policy domain. While this latter type of ‘vertical’ 
network (Cinalli 2004) has thus far received little scholarly attention, here it is treated as 
crucial for reaching a systematic appraisal of Muslims’ political integration. 
 
In sum, Muslims may or may not build ties of support and/or dissent with other actors 
across the public and policy domains, so our analysis seeks to (i) evaluate the shape and 
intensity of these interactions and (ii) to ass the extent to which the prevailing pattern of 
support and dissent maps onto deep divisions in the field. 
 
Along the first dimension, the main goal is to check whether Muslim actors engage 
extensively with other actors in the field—evidence showing the extensive prevalence of 
ties of support over dissent would serve as a first indication of political integration in the 
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field. But even if Muslims engage extensively both with civil society actors and with 
policy makers, we still need to check whether the way in which they engage occurs along 
some deep hidden cleavage in the field. Crucially, the presence of unconnected blocks of 
actors may reveal deep divisions and processes of polarisation at work in the field, with 
actors tending to engage only with ‘like-minded’ others. This is a crucial strand of our 
research, since ‘group polarisation’ is viewed with utmost concern in deliberative theory. 
Deliberative theorists worry that if a group of people from the same background 
(demographic, attitudinal etc.) meet to discuss an issue, their deliberations may conform 
to what Cass Sunstein calls ‘the law of group polarisation’ (Sunstein 2002). That law 
refers to a statistical regularity which allows us to predict that when like-minded people 
meet to discuss an issue of importance to them, they will move toward a more extreme 
point in the direction indicated by the median point of their prior views and opinions. Of 
course, the mere fact of moving in a more extreme direction is neither good nor bad in 
itself. But if people only engage in political discussions with ‘like-minded others’, the 
chances are that they will become more entrenched in their views and hence less 
responsive to the views of others. Insofar as this occurs, integration may be hindered 
rather than facilitated. 
 
As Dennis Thompson argues, the assumption that like-mindedness encourages group 
polarisation needs to be systematically tested (Thompson 2008, 502). We take up this 
challenge below. For now, though, the point to stress is that our analysis proceeds on 
basis that (i) the salience of support and dissent and (ii) the salience of deep divisions can 
be combined into an overall measure of political integration. Accordingly, the political 
integration of Muslims is well developed across both the public and the policy domains 
when, just like other actors in the field, their engagement is characterised by high 
intensity of support over dissent as well as low saliency of cleavages. By contrast, high 
intensity of dissent over support combined with high saliency of cleavages indicates a 
correspondingly low level of political integration. 
 
Data and design 
As indicated above, the overall design of the argument of this article has two main 
9 
 
components. The first component involves evaluating deliberative interventions in the 
field of ethnic relations in Britain, and specifically those interventions that allow us to 
assess how Muslim actors deliberate in comparison to other actors. Specifically, we code 
any intervention pertaining to Muslim and other ethnic or religious minority actors, as 
well as all interventions made by Muslim and other ethnic or religious minority actors 
themselves. The second component examines the relational dimension of the field, which 
extends from the core policy domain of governmental institutions and political elites to 
the public domain of civil society organisations. The aim of this second component is to 
study the networks and channels of political engagement between Muslims and other 
actors. Together, the two components allow us to appraise the purported link between 
public deliberation and political integration. 
 
Methodologically, the first component of our analysis draws upon ‘claims making 
analysis’ (Koopmans and Statham 1999; Giugni and Passy 2004) to assess the content of 
newspaper articles (we discuss some of the difficulties and dangers, but also some of the 
advantages, in coding newspapers below). This method has proved to be useful in 
analysing the roles and positions of different actors within national public spheres, 
extending the more traditional method of ‘protest event analysis’ in studies of contentious 
politics (Tilly et al. 1975; Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 1998). In our approach, claims 
making analysis is itself extended so as to go beyond an assessment of the public sphere 
in terms of its factual articulations in order to provide an evaluation of the quality of the 
deliberative interventions actors make. For us, a ‘deliberative intervention’ is a verbal 
statement made by an actor in the public sphere that rests upon a variable articulation of 
an argument in relation to the argument of another actor. That is to say, an actor that 
makes a deliberative intervention is an actor that takes an argumentative stance on an 
issue which can be read as supporting or opposing the argumentative stance taken by 
another actor in the same field on the same issue. 
 
Our coding breaks each deliberative intervention down into its elementary units along the 
structure of its linguistic grammar (Tilly 1995; Franzosi 2004). In particular, we focus on 
(i) the location of the intervention (where and when it occurred); (ii) the subject of the 
10 
 
intervention (the actor who makes the intervention); (iii) the target of the intervention 
(the actor supported or opposed by the intervention); (iv) the policy issue taken up in the 
intervention (the specific subject matter on which the subject intervenes); (v) the values 
that are used to frame the deliberative intervention; and (vi) the three general 
requirements of good deliberation discussed above (acceptable language, supporting 
arguments and appeals to the general interest). All of this information is coded in 
machine-readable format through SPSS and analysed through standard statistical tools. 
As regards the coding of our three deliberative requirements, we start by seeing if actors 
couch their interventions in language that is acceptable (e.g. because it is respectful or 
inclusive) or unacceptable (e.g. because it is offensive or designed to manipulate). We 
then check for the presence of a supporting argument and, more specifically, whether 
arguments are valid or spurious.
2
 Finally, we check whether the argument contains an 
appeal to a particular interest (e.g. the actor appeals only to the good of its own ethnic 
group) or to a general interest (e.g. the actor appeals to the good of society at large, rather 
than just to the good of its own ethnic group). 
 
Having assessed the field in terms of the quality of its deliberative interventions, network 
analysis then allows us to assess political integration in terms of relational dynamics 
amongst actors. Here, we rely on network measures (Knoke and Kuklinsky 1982; 
Wasserman and Faust 1994; Scott 2000) to assess patterns of relationships that actors, 
and specifically Muslims, forge with other actors. In particular, we focus on two main 
types of tie amongst actors, namely ties of support and ties of dissent (and hence the 
constellations of support and/or dissent which those ties form). As already noted, the 
literature on ‘group polarisation’ suggests that we should worry greatly if it turns out that 
Muslim actors talk only amongst themselves or, by corollary, only side with one another. 
In contrast, a more encouraging picture would be one in which Muslims engage in an 
extensive web of different types of relationships with a large variety of actors, thereby 
avoiding the creation, consolidation or deepening of divisions in the field. 
 
Thus, the second component of our research involves a different treatment of our data, as 
it rests upon the construction of matrices of ties rather than on the coding of attributes for 
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each deliberative intervention. Since our data are retrieved from newspapers, our concern 
is not with actors that argue back and forth in face-to-face contexts. Instead, we look for 
patterns of support or dissent so as to detect underlying structures of alliances and 
oppositions in the overall field. To this end, each actor is treated as a nodal focus from 
which ties of support and/or dissent radiate to other nodes—for example, when actor A 
says that it supports actor B’s position on the public funding of religious schools while 
actor C says that it opposes B’s position. Support and dissent are defined strictly, as we 
exclude actors that have engaged only in occasional relationships of this kind, producing 
no durable ties. Specifically, in seeking to capture the recursive nature of political 
argument, our operationalisation of a tierequires that two actors have referred to each 
other at least three times. If they do not meet this strict requirement, they do not feature in 
our analysis. 
 
Network analysis offers a number of different quantitative measures that can then be used 
to assess empirically both the overall shape of the field and the specific position of 
Muslim actors within it. Three measures are especially relevant to our inquiry. To begin 
with, ‘density’ gives us a ready sense of the degree of political integration (or lack 
thereof) in the field. It is usually defined as the ratio of actual ties to all possible ties (e.g. 
Wasserman and Faust 1994, 181). Density allows us to assess the overall degree of 
support and dissent in the field at an initial, aggregated level. 
 
Network analysis also enables us to say something more precise about the actual position 
each actor occupies in the field (Scott 2000, 83–85). We make use of two particular 
measures to gauge the centrality of an actor, namely ‘out-degree’ and ‘in-degree’ (Knoke 
and Burt 1983). Out-degree calculates the number of ties radiating from an actor, whereas 
in-degree calculates the number of ties radiating toward the actor. A high number of ties 
radiating from an actor (out-degree) is a clear indication of its ‘activism’ (vis-à-vis other 
actors) in the field, while a high number of ties radiating towards an actor (in-degree) is a 
clear indication of its relevance (to other actors). 
 
Finally, network analysis enables us to check for ‘cliques’, that is, blocks of actors that 
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stand out within the larger network for the fact that they have all forged mutual ties with 
one another (be that a bloc that is forged while supporting the position of, for example, 
the government on a given issue or one that is forged while dissenting from that position). 
Otherwise put, a clique is a group of actors in which each actor is directly tied to every 
other and hence where cohesion is at its highest (Doreian 1979, 51–52; Scott 2000, 114–
115). 
 
Our data on interventions and networks have been retrieved from the analysis of two 
widely read British newspapers, The Guardian and The Times, during the course of 2007. 
Although we accept that two newspapers cannot allow for a comprehensive analysis, we 
chose these two newspapers because each is a broadsheet newspaper with a long-standing 
reputation in terms of consistent and detailed coverage of news. We also chose them 
because together they offer a balanced left vs. right (labour vs. conservative) perspective. 
Following Statham et al. (2005), we have also tried to minimise the problem of 
description bias by only coding direct statements (usually, deliberative interventions are 
surrounded, wholly or partly, by inverted comas) and excluding secondary or indirect 
comments and evaluations by newspaper editors or reporters. We chose 2007 because we 
sought to gain at least some distance from the events of 2005, and in particular the 
London bombings, and hence to get a more ‘stable’ view of deliberative interventions in 
the field. 
 
It should be noted that our analysis does not depend on any preconceived, ‘essentialised’ 
notion of what it means to be a ‘Muslim’ (or ‘non-Muslim’). There may or may not be a 
relatively coherent and identifiable bloc within the British polity that can be labeled as 
‘Muslim’; and it may or may not be the case that the Muslim actors whose interventions 
we analyse are representative of that bloc. Our analysis does not take a position on these 
issues. Rather, an actor is coded as a ‘Muslim’ actor only if that actor unambiguously 
self-identifies as such or when they explicitly speak on behalf of a Muslim organization. 
Of course, we recognize that all newspapers are biased to one extent or another (McQuail 
1992, 193–195; Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009), and so one may have more 
general concerns about the representativeness of our data.
3
 Of particular relevance in the 
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present context is criticism of selection bias (McCarthy et al. 1996; Hocke 1998; Oliver 
and Maney 2000; Myers and Caniglia 2004) which points to the risk of portraying a 
distorted deliberative reality. Yet there are also grounds for arguing that the problem of 
selection bias should not be overplayed. For better or worse, newspaper reporting plays 
its part in constituting the world in which we live. Quite simply, one ‘does not need to 
adhere to the fashion for radical constructivism and post-modernism to recognise that the 
mass media contribute to the symbolic construction of realities’ (Peters et al. 2008, 139). 
Newspapers may report only a small number of deliberative interventions. Yet to a 
considerable extent, actors can only deliberate about the issues that are made publicly 
available to them. As such, our analysis supposes that strong selection mechanisms in the 
public sphere forge the borders within which deliberative interventions can occur. 
 
Findings 
Our findings cover a broad range of actors and a large number of deliberative 
interventions (n = 1007). Table 1 shows which types of actors have made deliberative 
interventions and how often. We also aggregate scores so as to distinguish between the 
policy, intermediate and broader public domains. 
 
Taken together, formal institutional actors account for 37.9 per cent of deliberative 
interventions. Civil society actors (including individuals) account for over half of all 
interventions (51.7 per cent). This suggests that, in contrast to a typical ‘client politics’ 
analysis, the field of ethnic relations is notable for the key role played by non-
governmental actors generally.
4
 This impression is reinforced by the fact that 
intermediate actors (including trade unions, political parties and the media) are much less 
visible than one might have expected (10.4 per cent), especially in view of their 
traditional role as ‘gatekeepers’ between the policy and public domains. 
 
However, within the broad category of civil society actors, religious and ethnic minorities 
are clearly visible (16.3 per cent). And on top of not having to rely on intermediate 
actors, they do not need to rely on pro-minorities organisations either (just 2.5 per cent). 
Table 2 tells us about how minorities feature in relation to one another; in this case, the 
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same deliberative interventions are analysed in terms of whether actors belong to the 
Muslim minority, to other minorities, or to no minority at all.
5 
 
Of the many minority actors that intervene in the field, Muslims feature most. In fact, 
they intervene more than all other minority actors combined. In one sense, this is 
understandable, since, as noted above, the integration of Muslims living in Britain has 
been hotly debated in recent years. Yet in another sense, the fact that Muslims intervene 
more than all other minority actors combined is surprising. Within the ethnic relations 
debate, a great deal of emphasis has been placed on the dangers of ‘communitarianism’, 
and in particular on the idea that many Muslims wish to close themselves off from 
engaging in an extensive dialogue with the broader society. Our data suggest that this 
worry may be overstated. 
 
The mere fact that an actor intervenes in a field suggests that they see some value in 
engaging with other actors. Yet before we can arrive at anything approaching a 
determinate judgement about Muslim actors—in comparison to other actors in the field—
we need to know whether or to what extent they meet our three requirements of good 
deliberation. Table 3 allows us to get some initial sense of the way that Muslims 
deliberate.
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More than 86 per cent of all interventions made by non-Muslim actors (760 out of 881) 
were couched in an acceptable language, while slightly less than 15 per cent (121 out of 
881) were couched in an unacceptable language. As Table 3 shows, the interventions 
Muslim actors make are just about as likely to be marked by language that is broadly 
acceptable (109 out of 126), with no relationship at work between the type of actor—
whether Muslim or non-Muslim—and the type of language (chi-square test is not 
significant). That is, for Muslims, acceptable language is the norm, just as it is for non-
Muslims. 
 
As we see from Table 4, non-Muslim actors meet the second requirement of having to 
provide a valid supporting argument about two-thirds of the time (562 out of 809). Only a 
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small number of interventions by non-Muslim actors (75 out of 809) contain a spurious 
argument, while non-Muslim actors fail to provide any argument (when the need for an 
argument was clearly implied) at all about one fifth of the time. Our data show that 
Muslim actors are just as likely as any other actor to offer a valid supporting argument. In 
fact, the fit between Muslim and non-Muslim actors in terms of percentages is strikingly 
close across all three value labels, with no relationship at work between the type of 
actor—whether Muslim or non-Muslim—and the type of argument is made (chi-square 
test is once again not significant). 
 
Our distinction between appealing to the general interest and appealing to a particular 
interest is of signal importance in any comparison of how Muslim and non-Muslim actors 
deliberate. In principle, if an actor only sees an issue narrowly from its own perspective 
when it is also clearly possible to take a broader view of that issue, then that actor is not 
thinking about how its views and opinions stand to affect other actors in society. As 
Table 5 shows, non-Muslim actors appeal to the general interest about two fifths of the 
time (298 out of 740). 
 
More specifically, institutional actors appeal to the general interest about nearly half of 
the time (45.9 per cent), with intermediary actors scoring equally high (45.1 per cent). 
Civil society actors also score relatively well, appealing to the general interest about 43 
per cent of the time. Interestingly, other (i.e. non-Muslim) religious or ethnic minority 
actors appeal to the general interest 42 per cent of the time. Yet, in the majority of cases 
(328 out of 740), non-Muslim actors do not refer to either a clearly identifiable particular 
interest or a clearly identifiable general interest. In comparison to non-Muslim actors, 
Muslim actors score relatively poorly on this measure, appealing to a general interest just 
over a quarter of the time (28 per cent). This time there is an important correlation at 
work between the type of actor—whether Muslim or non-Muslim—and the type of 
appeal to interest (with chi-square test close to full significance). That is, for Muslims, 
appealing to the general interest is certainly not as likely an occurrence as it is for non-
Muslims. 
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Now that we have seen how Muslims deliberate in comparison to other actors, we can 
move on to the second component of our analysis which appraises their political 
integration in relational terms. As we explained earlier, we begin by assessing the extent 
to which actors in general and Muslims in particular have forged ties of support or ties of 
dissent in the field. We then examine whether those ties of support and dissent are broken 
into cliques, which in turn enables us to detect entrenched blocks that may signal on-
going processes of polarisation. 
 
As a starting point, Figure 1 conveys a broad picture of ties of support in the field. 
Overall density is 0.23, which is to say that 23 per cent of all possible ties of support have 
been created. Given that the field is comprised of actors as diverse as Parliament, the 
extreme right, and Muslims, this figure indicates an extensive presence of relationships of 
mutual support in the field. Muslims are situated close to government, civil society 
organisations and the judiciary. By contrast, Muslims are relatively distant from actors 
whom one might naturally think of as their most natural interlocutors, such as pro-
minority actors. 
 
Continuing our analysis of networks of support, Table 6 enables us to gain a more 
nuanced understanding of the position of Muslims by considering our two indicators of 
centrality, that is, in-degree and out-degree.
7
 Muslims have a relatively high in-degree 
score, signalling that they can count on the support of a relatively large number of non-
Muslim actors. Along this dimension, only three actors—civil society organisations, 
individuals, and other religious and ethnic minority actors—occupy a more central 
position within the network as a whole. By contrast, intermediary actors such as political 
parties and the media have a relatively low in-degree score. 
 
Out-degree scores are roughly consistent with in-degree scores. Muslims have a relatively 
high out-degree score vis-à-vis other actors, which suggests that they are relatively active 
in terms of building ties of support. Intermediate actors again stand out for their low 
scores. In the case of the judiciary, there is a crucial mismatch between in-degree and 
out-degree (given that the latter is nearly three times the former), but this may have to do 
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with the fact that the judiciary is a major pillar for the defence of minorities in the policy 
domain (Joppke 2001). Almost half of all actors have greater out-degree than in-degree 
scores, which suggests that many actors are not complacent about their position in the 
field. 
 
Turning, then, to ties of dissent, Figure 2 shows that, with an overall density of 0.31, 
many actors join together with other actors in forging ties of dissent. There is more 
dissent than support, but not drastically so for such a supposedly contentious field. 
 
Muslim actors are now at the periphery of network, relatively distant from government 
and quite close to pro-minorities. In particular, as we can see in Table 7, Muslims engage 
in the building of ties of dissent with other actors more than other actors engage in 
building ties of dissent with Muslims. The position of government is perhaps as one 
might expect: In-degree is over three times higher than out-degree, and indeed 
government is by far the major target of dissent in the field, while government seems to 
have little interest in forging (or little need to forge) ties of dissent with other actors. 
 
We now turn to the analysis of cliques in the field, focusing on specific network portions 
where actors all share a tie with each other. In particular, we measure how many times 
couples of actors share a tie across different cliques, while at the same time assessing the 
extent to which this configuration of repeated ties across overlapping cliques amounts to 
a meaningful relational pattern in the field.
8
 As we see in Table 8, Muslims are present in 
about a third of cliques of support and in about a third of cliques of dissent. Muslims 
share ties of support with civil society and executive agencies across three different 
cliques; they share two cliques with individuals and the judiciary and one clique with 
government and the media. As regards ties of dissent, Muslims share five cliques with 
individuals, four cliques with government, two cliques with civil society, pro-minorities, 
ethnic extremists and the police, and one clique with employers. 
By broadening our analysis to all cliques in the field, we can detect blocks made of 
overlapping cliques.
9
 Figures 3 and 4 shed light on overlapping cliques of support and 
dissent respectively. 
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Having matched blocks of support with blocks of dissent, we can identify four main 
groups of actor, each linked to Muslim actors in a distinct type of relationship. First, 
actors such as the judiciary and executive agencies stand in (what might be termed) a 
relationship of consensus with Muslims, owing to the high connectedness of these actors 
within the same block of support coupled with their unconnectedness in terms of dissent. 
Secondly, actors such as pro-minorities and ethnic extremists stand in a relationship of 
opposition to Muslims, owing to the high connectedness of these actors within the same 
block of dissent coupled with their unconnectedness in terms of support. Civil society 
actors stand in a pragmatic relationship with Muslims, owing to their connectedness 
within blocks of both support and dissent at one and the same time. Lastly, actors such as 
unions and employers form a fourth group that stands out for its indifference vis-à-vis 
Muslims, owing to their striking unconnectedness in terms of both support and dissent. 
 
Discussion 
Muslim actors are just as likely as any other actor in the field of ethnic relations in Britain 
to use acceptable language and, moreover, to provide a valid argument in support of the 
positions that they take. To this extent, there is no disjunction between how Muslims 
deliberate and the broader policy field within which their interventions are located. 
However, when it comes to the requirement of appealing to the general interest, Muslim 
actors score relatively poorly: they only appeal to the general interest about a quarter of 
the time. 
 
Simply on the basis on this evidence, one might worry about the political integration of 
Muslims living in Britain. Yet as we have stressed from the outset, assumptions of this 
sort need to be systematically tested. Empirically-minded deliberative theorists have had 
much to say about whether the interventions actors make display the right sorts of 
attribute. Yet they have little to say about the relational dimensions of those 
interventions. Quantitative treatment of data in most deliberative studies, including, for 
example, studies which utilise the DQI mentioned earlier, has focused on how actors 
deliberate rather than on the linkages that they build. 
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To be sure, some scholars, most notably Donatella della Porta (2005), have already 
highlighted the importance of putting networks at the core of deliberative analysis. Yet, 
in della Porta’s account, networks act as facilitators of deliberation that help to increase 
the capacity of actors to meet the requirements of good deliberation. In other words, they 
are taken as a variable that helps to explain why one actor deliberates better than another. 
In our analysis, by contrast, networks are treated as macro-level explananda, whose 
precise shape can tell us much about what public deliberation actually achieves—namely, 
relationships of consensus, opposition, pragmatism or perhaps even mutual indifference. 
To assess those relationships, we consider not just the patterns of ties of support and 
dissent on which they rest, but also the cliques and cleavages with which they are bound 
up. We find that Muslim actors appear in about a third of cliques of support and dissent. 
The diverse composition of both sorts of clique is striking. But what is even more striking 
is that cliques do not map onto cleavages. The field is, in fact, characterised by 
overlapping cliques rather than by deep cleavages that might signal a lack of political 
integration. We do not find evidence of ‘group polarisation’ and we think that worries 
about ‘communitarianism’ may be overstated. 
 
That said, we agree that appealing to the general interest is, or at least can be, part of 
what it means to deliberate well. Yet the fact that Muslim actors score relatively poorly 
when it comes to appealing to the general interest does not seem to be a major 
impediment to their political integration. The reasons why are complex, but the following 
points strike us as especially noteworthy. Despite the fact that Muslim actors score 
relatively poorly in terms of appealing to the general interest, they can nevertheless count 
on the support of a relatively large number of non-Muslim actors for the positions that 
they take. Empirically, therefore, their failure to appeal to the general interest does not 
seem to have cost them their position in the field. 
 
Overall, our sense is that Muslim actors are reasonably well integrated, despite what, for 
example, elements in the British popular press would have us believe. They clearly want 
to engage and clearly are engaged with a broad range of actors across both policy and 
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public domains. Far from simply seeking to build ties of support or dissent with ‘like-
minded others’, the relationships in which they stand to other actors are multifaceted and 
complex. Their deliberative interventions link them to a diverse range of actors, with 
variable mixtures of consensus, conflict, pragmatism and indifference. This complexity 
would need to be taken into account in any thorough assessment of the political 
integration of Muslims living in Britain. Of course, ours is only a small contribution in 
this direction, but we hope it is nevertheless telling. Beyond the particular case of Britain, 
we hope we have shown why deliberative democrats should expand the horizons of their 
research so as make the link between public deliberation and political integration more 
central to their concerns. 
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1.  For example, Cantle 2001; Ouseley Report 2001; Home Office 2005; Meer 2006; 
Malik 2006/07; COIC 2007; Modood 2007; Policy Exchange 2007; Meer and Modood 
2009. 
2.  A ‘spurious’ argument is one where there is no clear connection between the claim 
being made and the argument offered in support of it (e.g. ‘John could not have planted 
the bomb because I know him to be a good father who pays his bills on time.’). By 
contrast, a ‘valid’ argument is one where, for example, the relevant facts or values on 
which the claim is based are clearly established and applicable, and where those same 
facts or values are plausibly connected to the conclusion drawn by the actor (e.g. ‘John 
could not have planted the bomb because he is a pacifist and in any case was out of the 
country at the time’). 
3.  See Earl et al. 2004 and Ortiz et al. 2005 for general overviews of criticisms of the use 
of newspaper data; for analyses that seek to relate such criticisms to the specific case of 
Muslims in Britain, see Richardson 2009 and Meer 2006. 
4.  Typically, on a ‘client politics’ analysis, political elites shape an expansionist 
multicultural agenda in ‘hidden’ agreement with the most powerful stakeholders and 
Muslim actors themselves, without engaging in an extensive dialogue with civil society 
actors across the public sphere more generally (e.g. Freeman 2002). 
5.  In Table 1, the variable is ‘actor status’. Here, in Table 2, the variable is ‘religion’. 
Hence, individuals from Table 1 with a clearly stated religious identity have been 
reassigned. 
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6.  In this case, we aggregate figures in a way so as to consider both the ‘status’ attribute 
of Table 1 and the ‘minority’ attribute of Table 2. This allows us to check both for the 
presence of some types of actors over others and for the contrast between Muslims and 
non-Muslims. The same logic underlies the construction of Tables 4 and 5. 
7.  In-degree and out-degree scores are calculated by working out the ratio, that is, a 
proportion in percentage between the total ties an actor forges (in terms of in- or out-ties) 
and the total ties that that actor might possibly forge. For example, a score of 46.7 for in-
degree means that the actor receives 46.7 per cent of all ties that it may receive (if all the 
other actors were forging out-ties with it). So, in one network with 1,000 actors, 46.7 
means that the selected actor has 467 ties. 
8.  Formally, a clique is the maximum number of actors who have all possible ties present 
among themselves. Three is the minimum number of actors required to form a clique. 
9.  Here we proceed by identifying all couples of actors sharing a common presence in 
the same clique; we then build blocks of cliques around couples of actors, from couples 
sharing the highest number of cliques to couples with a lower number of cliques. 
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Table 1  
Deliberative Interventions: Actors 
Government 12.5 
(126) 
Parliament 5.1 (51) 
Judiciary 8.0 (81) 
Police and security 
agencies 
6.9 (69) 
Executive agencies 5.5 (55) 
All Institutional Actors 37.9 
(382) 
Media 4.9 (49) 
Political parties 2.9 (29) 
Employers’ organisations 0.9 (9) 
Unions and employees 1.8 (18) 
All Intermediate Actors 10.4 
(105) 
Religious or ethnic 
minority actors 
16.3 
(164) 
Pro-minority actors 2.5 (25) 
Civil society actors 13.1 
(132) 
Minority religious or 
ethnic extremists 
0.5 (5) 
Extreme right  0.1 (1) 
Individuals  19.2 
(193) 
All Civil Society Actors  51.7 
(520) 
Total 100.0 
(1007) 
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Table 2 
Deliberative Interventions: Muslim Actors in Comparison to Other Actors 
Muslims 12.5 
(126) 
Other religious 
minorities 
4.5 (45) 
Other (non-religious) 
minority actors 
3.8 (38) 
All other actors 79.2 
(798) 
Total 100.0 
(1007) 
 
 
Table 3  
Quality of Deliberation: Use of Language 
% 
Unaccept
able 
Accepta
ble Total 
Institutional actors 12.6 (48) 87.4 
(334) 
100.0 
(382) 
Intermediate actors 25.8 (27) 74.2 
(78) 
100.0 
(105) 
Civil society organisations (excluding all religious or 
ethnic minority organisations) 
6.3 (10) 93.7 
(148) 
100.0 
(158) 
Religious or ethnic minority organisations (excluding 
Muslim organisations) 
6.0 (4) 94.0 
(63) 
100.0 
(67) 
Individuals (excluding Muslims) 18.9 (32) 81.1 
(137) 
100.0 
(169) 
All non-Muslims 13.7 
(121) 
86.3 
(760) 
100.0 
(881) 
Muslim actors 13.5 (17) 86.5 
(109) 
100.0 
(126) 
Total 13.7 
(138) 
84.5 
(851) 
100.0 
(1007) 
2 0.005 ns. 
†
 P < 0.10; * P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01; *** P < 0.001. 
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Table 4 
Quality of Deliberation: Supporting Arguments 
% 
Spurious 
argument 
No 
argument 
Valid 
argument Total 
Institutional actors 7.3 (26) 18.4 (65) 74.3 (263) 100.0 
(354) 
Intermediate actors 17.7 (17) 29.2 (28) 53.1 (51) 100.0 
(96) 
Civil society organisations 
(excluding all religious or ethnic 
minority organisations) 
1.3 (2) 16.0 (24) 82.7 (124) 100.0 
(150) 
Religious or ethnic minority 
organisations (excluding Muslim 
organisations) 
5.2 (3) 17.2 (10) 77.6 (45) 100.0 
(58) 
Individuals (excluding Muslims) 17.9 (27) 29.8 (45) 52.3 (79) 100.0 
(151) 
All non-Muslims 9.3 (75) 21.3 
(172) 
69.5 (562) 100.0 
(809) 
Muslim actors 7.2 (8) 21.6 (24) 71.2 (79) 100.0 
(111) 
Total 9.0 (83) 21.3 
(196) 
69.7 (641) 100.0 
(920)
‡
 
‡
 N excludes deliberative interventions where the provision of a supporting argument was 
not applicable, for example, a factual statement in response to a call for clarification. 
2 0.507 ns. 
†
 P < 0.10; * P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01; *** P < 0.001. 
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Table 5 
Quality of Deliberation: Appeals to Interest 
% 
Particular 
interest 
General 
interest 
No clearly 
identifiable 
interest Total 
Institutional actors  
12.8 (42) 45.9 (151) 41.3 (136) 
100.0 
(329) 
Intermediate actors  
8.8 (8) 45.1 (41) 46.2 (42) 
100.0 
(91) 
Civil society organisations 
(excluding all religious or ethnic 
minority organisations) 
20.0 (28) 42.9 (60) 37.1 (52) 
100.0 
(140) 
Religious or ethnic minority 
organisations (excluding Muslim 
organisations) 
47.4 (27) 42.1 (24) 10.5 (6) 
100.0 
(57) 
Individuals (excluding Muslims) 
7.3 (9) 17.9 (22) 74.8 (92) 
100. 
(123) 
All non-Muslims 
15.4 (114) 40.3 (298) 44.3 (328) 
100.0 
(740) 
Muslims 
18.0 (18) 28.0 (28) 54.0 (54) 
100.0 
(100) 
Total 
15.7 (132) 38.8 (326) 45.5 (382) 
100.0 
(840)
‡
 
‡
 N excludes deliberative interventions that did not involve interests, for example, purely 
factual interventions, and hence where this category was not applicable. 
2 5.609† 
†
 P < 0.10; * P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01; *** P < 0.001. 
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Table 6 
Networks of Support: Actors’ Degree 
 Out-Degree In-Degree 
Government 46.7 33.3 
Muslims 26.7 33.3 
Religious or ethnic minority 
organisations (excluding 
Muslim organisations) 
33.3 46.7 
Individuals 53.3 46.7 
Judiciary  53.3 20.0 
Civil society organisations 26.7 53.3 
Executive agencies 53.3 26.7 
Police and security agencies 6.7 13.3 
Pro-minority organisations 13.3 6.7 
Parliament 0.0 6.7 
Media 6.7 13.3 
Political parties 13.3 6.7 
Employers 20.0 20.0 
Unions 6.7 6.7 
Minority religious or ethnic 
extremists  
6.7 0.0 
Extreme right  0.0 13.3 
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Table 7 
Networks of Dissent: Actors’ Degree 
 Out-Degree In-Degree 
Government 26.7 86.7 
Muslims 46.7 26.7 
Religious or ethnic minority 
organisations (excluding 
Muslim organisations) 
33.3 53.3 
Individuals 53.3 53.3 
Judiciary  26.7 20.0 
Civil society organisations 20.0 53.3 
Executive agencies 40.0 20.0 
Police and security agencies 46.7 46.7 
Pro-minority organisations  40.0 13.3 
Parliament 26.7 6.7 
Media 40.0 40.0 
Political parties 20.0 13.3 
Employers 13.3 20.0 
Unions 13.3 0.0 
Minority religious or ethnic 
extremists  
40.0 26.7 
Extreme right  6.7 13.3 
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Table 8 
Muslims in Cliques of Support and Dissent 
Support (9 cliques in total) 
Dissent (18 cliques in 
total) 
1: Muslims CS Indiv 
Judiciary Ex.Agencies 
2: Muslims Media CS Indiv 
Ex.Agencies 
3: Gov Muslims CS Judiciary 
Ex.Agencies 
1: Gov Muslims CS Pro-
Min Indiv 
2: Gov Muslims Pro-Min 
Indiv Police 
3: Gov Muslims CS 
Ethn.Extr Indiv 
4: Gov Muslims Ethn.Extr 
Indiv Police 
5: Muslims Indiv 
Employers 
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Figure 1 
Ties of support  
 
 
Density = 0.23 
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Figure 2 
Ties of dissent  
 
 
 
Density = 0.31 
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Figure 3 
Overlapping cliques of support 
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Figure 4 
Overlapping cliques of dissent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
